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1	 Introduction:	Background	of	Vietnam’s	Legal	System
While the economy is a “multi-component commodity,” the politics is not yet “multi- party.” It is expressly recognized in Article 4 of the 1992 Constitution that Viet-
nam is a socialist country under the leadership of a single party: the communist party of 
Vietnam (the “Party”). The Party is a large organization which has many para-administra-
tive organs, expanding to the lowest administrative levels, under the leadership of a gen-
eral secretary. He is voted for and elected by the Party’s National Congress which is held 
once every five years. The National Assembly is the supreme legislative body and consists 
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The Constitution in force (1992) consists of 147 articles divided into twelve 
chapters after a preamble, embodying the policy and legislation of Doi Moi. As 
for the political system, it is stipulated that: “The State promotes a multi-com-
ponent commodity economy functioning in accordance with market mecha-
nisms under the management of the State and following a socialist orienta-
tion. The multi-component economic structure with various forms of 
organization of production and trading is based on a system of ownership by 
the entire people, by collectives, and by private individuals, of which owner-
ship by the entire people and by collectives constitutes the foundation.” This 
article provides an acute analysis of the structural and procedural provisions of 
the frameworks for contract enforcement in Vietnam, addressing both domes-
tic and foreign transactional disputes and the key issues associated with these. 
The link between Doi Moi, and consequential integration with the interna-
tional economy and the influence of collective interests stipulated in the Con-
stitution are discussed in this article, and we also consider examples from other 
jurisdictions to provide both insight and an understanding into this relation-
ship that defines contract enforcement in Vietnam.
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zens over 18 years of age may vote and those over 21 may stand for election. The Assem-
bly will elect the Prime Minister who will nominate his ministers to establish the Govern-
ment, subject to the adoption of the National Assembly. The Assembly also elects the 
President of the State Council (the “President”). The President together with the Prime 
Minister and the General Secretary of the Party become a triumvirate of powers in Viet-
nam.
1.1 Social and Cultural Values
Like in all Far East countries, Vietnamese culture has been developed by Buddhism, 
Confucianism, and Taoism. Confucianism is based on fundamental individual obligations 
toward collective structures, Taoism favors a state of resignation, flexibility, and modesty, 
while Buddhism views life as a “circle between reason and consequence.” Hierarchy, 
trust, and loyalty are the cornerstones of harmony. Vietnamese cultural values now are 
mixed with various foreign influences, the most visible of which are from China and 
France. For example, the tradition of codification in Vietnamese law is inherited from 
French culture, but the reluctance to bring a dispute into court most probably stems from 
Taoism, a philosophy from China.
1.2 Legal Family
While features of the French legal system are still visible in Vietnamese contract law 
today, it would be a mistake to think that the current Vietnamese Civil Code is just similar 
to the French Napoleonic Code. The laws of other socialist and ex-socialist countries, 
such as Russia and China, also have great influence on Vietnamese civil law. With its long 
history of wars, foreign influence, and its specific political system, it is difficult to place 
the Vietnamese legal system into a particular legal family. For certain, Vietnamese legal 
systems belong to civil law legal systems. During the period of real-socialism (1954-
1986), the idea of private property was not encouraged and as such, dismissed the raison 
d’etre of the Civil Code. The old judiciary system was abolished. New judges did not 
know French law, thus as time passed, the influence of French law in Vietnam became an 
event of the past. Instead, the law on obligations are mostly influenced by the Civil Codes 
of socialist countries, most notably the Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic 
of China and the civil codes of the Russian Federation Soviet Republic and the German 
Democratic Republic. Vietnamese theorists worry little about the identity of Vietnamese 
law. They will adapt whatever the laws, with appropriate modification, as long as they are 
suitable to the socio-economic environment of the country.
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1.3 The Role of Legislation
Departing from the classical doctrine of the separation of powers, legislation is exe-
cuted by the Government and National Assembly together. In Vietnam, law is not only a 
body of rules enacted by the National Assembly. The National Assembly meets only two 
sessions a year, each session lasting for 15 days. Therefore, only the most important acts 
are passed as laws: the codes, budget and various tax laws, and some important economic 
laws such as foreign investment law or credit institution law. The remaining part of Viet-
namese law is governed by ordinances from the Standing Committee, the President, and 
sub-law documents, such as decrees, circulars, and orders. In short, the National Assem-
bly passes Laws, the Standing Committee issues Ordinances, and the Government issues 
Decrees. Those laws and sub-laws are subject to be further interpreted and sometime sup-
plemented by Circulars, Resolutions, and Decisions of the Ministries explaining the ap-
plication of the higher legislation. Decrees are sometimes issued with attached Regula-
tions. To date, there is no Constitutional Court, as in other democratic countries, to 
exercise judicial review of Decrees and Regulations. Such control is in the hands of the 
National Assembly, assisted by the State Investigation Agency. Contracts in Vietnam are 
regulated by many laws and regulations. Each type of contract is subject to one specific 
regime. For example, the Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, and the Decree on Tech-
nology Transfer and its implementing Circular, govern technology transfer contracts. A 
specific Circular governs management contracts. Agency contracts are governed by Com-
mercial Law and various Circulars of the Ministry of Trade, etc. In general, contracts are 
subject to the Ordinance on Economic Contracts (OEC), the Commercial Law 1997 (CL), 
and most importantly, the Vietnamese Civil Code 1996 (CC).
1.4 The Position of the Judiciary
The judiciary consists of independent judges who are selected by the President. The 
organization of the judiciary is provided for by the Law on People’s Judicature. There are 
three levels of ordinary courts in Vietnam (the “People’s courts”). Those are the District 
People’s courts, provincial or city People’s courts, and the People’s Supreme Court. Apart 
from ordinary courts, there are also special tribunals such as administrative courts, eco-
nomic courts, and labor courts, which form parts of the provincial People’s court, as well 
as military tribunals. The People’s Supreme Court supervises and directs the judicial work 
of the People’s courts, military tribunals, and special tribunals. District courts deal, gener-
ally speaking, with less important criminal and civil cases, whereas the more important 
cases together with labor cases and economic cases are dealt with by the People’s provin-
cial courts. Appeals from judgment of the district courts may be lodged in the provincial 
courts. There are also courts of appeal affiliated with the People’s Supreme Court in Ha-
noi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Da Nang. Finally, there is a possibility of cassation by the 
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People’s Supreme Court. It does not re-assess the facts of a case but only reviews the le-
gality of the judgment from procedural or material viewpoints. Administrative disputes 
are dealt with by either the supervisory administrative organs or administrative courts. To 
date, examples of the work of administrative courts are still limited. The Ministry of Jus-
tice is responsible for management of local courts. In principle, judges were elected, were 
independent, and obey the law only. Together with judges, cases are also decided by the 
People’s laymen. A person elected as a judge or a People’s layperson must be a Vietnam-
ese citizen, loyal to the Fatherland and to socialism, and have the required legal knowl-
edge and a determined spirit to protect the socialist legal system. In practice, the legal 
knowledge of judges in Vietnam is still to be supplemented. Some of them have not fin-
ished university legal education but have considerable experience instead.
2	 Contract	Enforcement	in	Vietnam
In recent years, Vietnam has been very successful in attracting foreign investment by 
improving its economic system, including the legal infrastructure of contract enforce-
ment. When conducting business in Vietnam, foreign investors and even local business-
man may want to see and know how the legal framework and/or the regime that Vietnam-
ese law provides enforces a contract, especially a commercial contract.  Civil enforcement 
of contracts in Vietnam is a two-track system. The first is a judicial track whereby a party 
to a contract requests a court judgment. The second is a judicial track in which complaints 
are filed through the arbitral system. In general, both of these tracks are equal to each oth-
er, meaning parties to a contract are entitled to make their choice of which dispute resolu-
tion system they would like to take. Consequently, the very first question that parties and 
their lawyers will ask should help to determine who has the jurisdiction to resolve a dis-
pute. Similar to other countries, Vietnam adopts a legal principle of using an arbitral cen-
ter solely in cases of having parties’ mutual consent; concequently, in such a case, if one 
party initiates a lawsuit at a court, the court will refuse to handle it unless the arbitration 
agreement is invalid or unrealizable, meaning the court may accept to hear the case if 
there is no arbitral agreement up to the date a petition is filed.
2.1 Court Jurisdiction
The District Court is competent to judge the cases in their first instance stage. Under 
the Civil Procedure Code, the District Court is not of  competent jurisdiction to hear  cer-
tain  cases, including disputes related to intellectual property,  technology transfer,  and 
cases wherein the disputable properties are located in different provinces within Vietnam-
ese territory. The  Provincial  Court  is  of  competent  jurisdiction  to  hear  in  the  first 
instance   cases which  are  not  under  the  competent  jurisdiction  of  the  District  Court. 
However,  as  to  cases where the District Court hears in the first instance,  the Provincial 
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Court  functions as  the court of appeals to review  and judge on any appeal against judg-
ments made by the District Court in the first instance. As for requests for recognition and 
enforcement of foreign courts’ and foreign arbitrators’ judgments in Vietnam, the Provin-
cial Court has  competent jurisdiction to make such decisions. The  Supreme  Court is  the 
competent  jurisdiction that can review  and  judge  on  any  appeal or protest against 
judgments made by the Provincial Court or court of appeals. Disputes  related to the juris-
diction between the District Courts within the domain of a central province, or central 
city,  to hear a specific case are settled by the Chief Judge of the relevant Provincial 
Court. Disputes related to the jurisdiction between the District Courts of the different cen-
tral  provinces,  central  cities,  or  disputes  related  to  jusrisdiction  between  the  Pro-
vincial Courts are settled by the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court.
2.2 Procedure
2.2.1 Commencement of Proceedings
A statement of claim must be made in writing and contain information stipulated in 
Article 164.2 of Civil Procedure Code, with supporting documentation. If the court wish-
es to accept the case, it will inform the plaintiff of the court fee, which must be paid. Pay-
ment of this fee must be made within 15 days of receiving the notice. The Court will offi-
cially accept the case when the plaintiff submits a receipt for payment of the court fee 
deposit.
2.2.2 Preparation for Hearing the Case
Within three working days of the date of acceptance of the case, the Court will give 
notice in writing to the defendant that it has accepted the case. Within 15 working days of 
receipt of notice, the defendant must lodge an answer in writing against the claim of the 
plaintiff and attach documents or evidence, if any, with the Court. The Court shall then 
organize at least one, but typically two conciliation meetings between the parties. There 
are two possible outcomes to these meetings; firstly, if the parties reach a successful 
agreement, the Court will take minutes of the conciliation in which the parties mutually 
agree on all the matters in dispute. If the parties do not reject the agreement within seven 
working days of preparation of the minutes, the Court will issue a decision acknowledg-
ing the settlement. The decision shall be effective immediately after the issuance date and 
can neither be appealed nor protested against in accordance with appeals procedures. Sec-
ondly, if the parties fail to reach an agreement, the Court will issue a decision to bring the 
case to a hearing.
2.2.3 Stages
2.2.3.1 First Instance Hearing
Under the Civil Procedure Code, the court must conduct a trial within one month of 
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the decision to bring the case to a hearing. In the opening stage of the hearing, the court 
will also ask whether the parties could reach mutual agreement on the settlement of the 
dispute. If an agreement is reached, the court will issue a decision recognizing the agree-
ment. In the event the parties still maintain their claims and fail to reach an agreement, the 
council of adjudicators will commence the hearing by listening to the presentation of the 
parties.
2.2.3.2 Appeal
If a party disagrees with the holding at first instance, an appeal must be heard in the 
court that held the trial at first instance within 15 days of the decision. After accepting the 
qualified appeal, the first instance court must give notice in writing to the Prosecution In-
stitute and all affected parties. The relevant parties are obliged to give their responses to 
the appeal. The Appellate Courts do not review the case in its entirety; rather, they only 
review those parts which are specifically appealed or protested against or related to the 
review of the appealed or protested contents. The Appellate Court may; (i) uphold the 
first-instance judgments; (ii) revise the first-instance judgments; (iii) repeal the first-in-
stance judgments and transfer the case files to the first instance court for retrial of the 
case; or (iv) abrogate the first-instance judgments and stop the resolution of the case. The 
appellate judgments take effect on the date they are pronounced.
2.2.3.3 Review
Under the laws of Vietnam, involved parties may petition for review (second appeal) 
of a case on the grounds of legal error or newly discovered evidence. The decision to 
grant such a review is made administratively by either the Chief Judge or Chief Procura-
tor of a competent court or Procuracy. The grant of a review can also be accompanied by 
an order for the stay of enforcement. The review takes place in closed court rooms where 
the parties are not permitted to submit arguments. The non-transparent nature of this pro-
cess, plus the lengthy review period (e.g., 12 months for a petition for review of a legal 
error), increases the uncertainty often attributed to Vietnam’s litigation system.
2.3 What to Note When Taking the Court System as a Dispute Resolution 
Body
There are many cases reported to the Vietnamese Supreme Court and they illustrate 
some significant lessons that parties who use Vietnamese courts to resolve contract dis-
putes may want to keep in mind.
2.4 Statute of Limitations
According to Article 159 of the Civil Procedure Code, the statute of limitations for 
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initiating civil lawsuits complies with provisions of the law. According to Article 23.1 of 
Resolution No. 03/2012/NQ-HDTP dated 3 December 2012, for civil disputes whose stat-
ute of limitations is stipulated in the relevant legislation, then such statute of limitations 
shall apply. For example, in the case between two enterprises with a dispute related to a 
distribution contract, provisions of the Commercial Code 2005 shall apply. Specifically, 
according to Article 319 of the Commercial Code, “the statute of limitations for lawsuits 
applicable to commercial disputes shall be two years from the time when the lawful rights 
and interests are infringed upon.”
Under the law, the statute of limitations for initiating a court case re-commences in 
the following cases; (i) the obligor has acknowledged a part or all of their obligations to-
wards the person initiating the lawsuit; (ii) the obligor has fulfilled a portion of their obli-
gations towards the person initiating the lawsuit; or (iii) the parties have reconciled with 
each other. The statute of limitation re-commences from the date following the date upon 
which any of the above event occurs. Of note, in courts’ dispute-settlement practice, if 
one party responds to or attends a meeting convened to discuss the dispute, such actions 
are taken to revive the statute of limitations.
2.5 Judicial Conciliation
In the stage of first instance, there will be several conciliation sessions organized un-
der a judge’s supervision before the hearing date for the purpose of providing parties a 
chance to reach mutual agreement to settle their disputes. In this case, if a dispute settle-
ment agreement is reached, the court will issue a decision recognizing such an agreement 
after 7 days from the date of that agreement. This decision by the court will be valid and 
be able to be enforced by a competent Civil Enforcement Department.
2.6 Court’s Judgment Effectiveness
Judgments made by the courts in the first instance will solely come into effect to be 
enforced if there is no appeal filed against such judgments within 15 days as from the date 
stated in the judgments.  If the involving parties are absent from the court’s judgment dec-
laration session, the foresaid time limit  would be counted from the date when the judg-
ment is delivered to the parties or is posted. Judgment  made by the court of appeals be-
comes effective to be enforced as of the date on which it is declared and can solely be 
reviewed under the procedure of either cassation or reopening.
2.7 Foreign Dispute Party and Foreign Legal Counsel
The law on investment of Vietnam does not allow a foreign investor to refer a dispute 
to a court in a foreign jurisdiction. Vietnamese judges cannot apply foreign law to a case 
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before them and foreign lawyers cannot participate in proceedings as representatives, ad-
vocates, or protectors of the lawful rights and interests of concerned parties. Thus, Viet-
namese courts will probably not uphold choice of law contract provisions if such provi-
sion is made in breach of the laws of Vietnam.
2.8 Arbitration System
According to the newly enacted Law 54/2010/QH12 on Commercial Arbitration, as of 
1 January 2011, arbitration in Vietnam covers (i) disputes arising from commercial activi-
ties; (ii) disputes between the disputants, among those at least one carrying out commer-
cial activities; and (iii) other disputes to be settled by arbitration as provided by law. 
Commercial disputes include the performance of one or many trading acts by business 
people or organizations, including the purchase and sale of goods, providing services, dis-
tribution, trade representation and agencies, consignment, renting and leasing, hire pur-
chasing arrangements, construction, consultancy, technology, licensing, investment, fi-
nancing, banking, insurance, exploration and exploitation, transport of goods and 
passengers by air, sea, rail, land, and other commercial acts as prescribed by law. Disputes 
between the involved parties are to be settled by an arbitral tribunal organized by an arbi-
tration center such as the Financial and Commercial Center for Arbitration (FCCA), Viet-
nam International Arbitration Center (VIAC), or through ad-hoc arbitration set up by the 
parties involved. An arbitral tribunal will be composed of one or more arbitrators as 
agreed by the disputing parties. If the parties cannot agree on the number of arbitrators, 
the arbitral tribunal will be composed of three arbitrators.
2.9 Arbitration Procedure
The first step involves the claimant submitting a statement of claim containing the fol-
lowing; (i) information on the parties concerned; (ii) a brief of the dispute’s contents; (iii) 
the legal grounds supporting the claims; (iv) the value of the dispute; and (v) the name of 
the arbitrator appointed by the claimant. In addition, the claimant has to provide support-
ing evidence and pay the arbitration fee in advance. It is sometimes possible to amend, 
add, or withdraw claims before the arbitral tribunal issues an award. In the second step, 
the Arbitration Center will check the adequacy of the application file. If the application 
file meets the required conditions, a notice will be served to both the claimant and respon-
dent. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties or provided by the Arbitration Center’s rules 
of proceedings, the respondent must send its statement of defense to the Arbitration Cen-
ter within 30 days of receiving the claimants’ claim. A statement of defense must contain; 
(i) the date on which the statement is written; (ii) the name and address of the respondent; 
(iii) the name of the arbitrator by the respondent; and (iv) argument and evidence in de-
fense, including rejection or part of the whole of the claimants’ claim. If the respondent 
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does not submit its statement of defense or the statement of defense does not mention the 
appointment of an arbitrator, the President of the Arbitration Center will appoint an arbi-
trator for the respondent. In the third step, within 151 days of being selected, the two arbi-
trators must select from the list of arbitrators of the Arbitration Center a third arbitrator to 
act as chairman. In the fourth step, the arbitrators will examine the submissions and verify 
the facts regarding the dispute. The arbitral tribunal may meet the parties to hear their 
opinions and gather evidence. The parties may request the arbitral tribunal to act as con-
ciliator. If the conciliation is successful, the parties may request the arbitral tribunal to re-
cord and issue decisions recognizing the successful conciliation. The successful concilia-
tion record must be signed by the parties and the arbitrators. The arbitral tribunal’s 
decision recognizing the successful conciliation will be final and binding. Finally, in the 
fifth step, if the parties cannot reach a conciliation agreement, the arbitral tribunal will 
open a hearing of the case. The time for opening the hearing will be decided by the chair-
man of the arbitral tribunal, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. The hearing will be 
conducted in private. The arbitral tribunal may permit other persons to attend the hearing 
with the approval of the parties. The parties may directly attend or authorize their repre-
sentatives to attend the hearing. They may invite witnesses and lawyers to protect their 
rights and legitimate interests. The arbitral tribunal’s award will be made under the major-
ity principle, except where disputes are settled by a sole arbitrator. Awards may be an-
nounced at the final meeting or afterwards but no later than 30 days after the end of the fi-
nal meeting.
2.10  Enforcement of Domestic Arbitral Awards
Decisions from Vietnam’s arbitration centers are final and binding on the parties and 
may be enforced by the Enforcement Department in the same manner as an enforceable 
court decision. This gives domestic arbitral awards an advantage over foreign arbitral 
awards or court judgments (which may be subject to appeals or cassation).
2.11   What to Note When Using an Arbitral Tribunal as a Dispute 
Resolution Body
A dispute resolution clause reflecting parties’ mutual consent to a certain arbitration 
center/type as hearing body is the very first condition to be satisfied, otherwise Vietamese 
courts will have no jurisdiction over disputes. Hence, the first issue in case of choosing 
arbitration is the aforementioned clause. Accordingly, such a clause should not merely 
prescribe whether and where an arbitration tribunal should be used, but also should clear-
1 This period might be shorter depending on a certain applicable arbitral rule.
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ly provide information concerning the applicable law (this can be at the tribunal’s choice 
in cases involving foreign parties in the dispute); the arbitration language, and the number 
of arbitrators. Secondly, unlike the court system, there is no obligation for the tribunal to 
organize any conciliation between parties unless it is requested by the parties. However, 
in case there is a conciliation session requested and organized under the tribunal’s witness 
and parties can reach a mutual agreement to settle the dispute, the tribunal may recognize 
such an agreement by its decision. And this decision is equally legal and enforceable in 
comparision with an arbitral award. Thirdly, to settle a dispute fairly, sometimes the ap-
pointed tribunal might need to have further investigation or apply an injunctive relief. In 
those cases, the tribunal will obtain a court order to do so that might take time and nega-
tively effect the legitimate benefit of the parties. Last but not least, arbitral awards are fi-
nal and binding, and may be challenged only in certain limited circumstances. A party 
may request a domestic arbitral award to be set aside on certain grounds within thirty (30) 
days of the date the award was granted. And in case a foresaid request is filed to the com-
petent court, it will takes months and/or years for such a court to review the award to 
grant its final decision regarding the validity of that award. As a result, the losing party 
might take advantage of this weakness of law to delay the arbitral award enforcement pro-
cedure implemented by the civil enforcement department, and dispose of its property.
2.12  General Note to Enforce a Foreign Arbitral Award in Vietnam
Under the Civil Procedure Code, foreign arbitral awards are arbitral awards rendered 
outside Vietnam or those rendered by non-Vietnamese arbitrators within Vietnam. As the 
law currently stands, Vietnamese courts will only consider an application for recognition 
and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award if the award has been made in or by arbitra-
tors of a country being a party to the New York Convention, or to the extent that the coun-
try in question grants reciprocal treatment to Vietnam. Vietnam ratified the New York 
Convention in 1995. There have been many instances where Vietnamese courts have en-
forced foreign arbitral awards.
2.13  Procedure for Seeking Recognition
An organization or individual with a foreign arbitral award rendered in favor of it may 
petition a Vietnamese court for recognition and enforcement of the award, provided that 
(i) with respect to the organization, the losing party maintains its head office in Vietnam; 
(ii) with respect to an individual, the individual resides or works in Vietnam; or (iii) the 
enforcement relates to property which is in Vietnam at the time the petition is made. An 
award recognized by a Vietnamese court will have the same legal effect as a judgment 
given by a Vietnamese court and can be enforced in Vietnam.
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2.14  Grounds for Rejection of Foreign Arbitral Awards
A Vietnamese court may reject an application for recognition and enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award if the respondent can provide evidence proving that (i) the parties 
lacked the capacity to sign the arbitration agreement in accordance with the law applica-
ble to each party; (ii) the arbitration agreement is invalid under the applicable law; (iii) 
the respondent did not receive due notice of the appointment of arbitrators or the arbitra-
tion proceedings or for other legitimate reasons, the respondent could not exercise its 
rights in the proceedings; (iv) the foreign arbitral award was made where no settlement 
was requested or was beyond the request of the disputing parties; (v) the composition of 
the arbitration body and/or the arbitration proceedings was not in accordance with the ar-
bitration agreement of the parties or the applicable law; (vi)  the award is not yet binding 
on the parties; or (vii) the award has been overruled or suspended by competent authori-
ties of the countries where the award was made or whose law was the governing law. In-
terestingly, the procedures prescribed by law in relation to the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards appear to grant only the respondent (i.e., the party who is 
subject to enforcement of the arbitral award) the right to participate in the court hearing. 
The applicant (i.e., the party seeking recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award) 
does not appear to enjoy a similar right.
2.15  Practical Issues
In addition to the legal requirements above, an investor should consider the practical 
issues of enforcing a foreign arbitral award in Vietnam. Although the law states that the 
courts should ratify awards which meet the requirements stated above without a discus-
sion of their merits, the Vietnamese courts have historically gone beyond this legal rule. 
As such, it is not uncommon for judges to refuse to enforce an award because; (i) the un-
derlying contract (including the arbitration provision) was invalid due to the fact that the 
signatory to that contract was not duly authorized to sign it; (ii) the dispute should not be 
resolved by arbitration under the laws of Vietnam, or the recognition and enforcement of 
the award is contrary to the “basic principles of the laws of Vietnam,” a concept which has 
had a vague expression in law; or (iii) upon an analysis of the factual content of the case, 
the judge believes the award should not have been granted. That is, in contravention of the 
written law, the Court decides to re-hear and re-consider the case already decided by the 
arbitrator and then reaches a different conclusion. However, since the WTO accession in 
2007, the Vietnamese government has made strong efforts to strengthen the enforcement 
regime by introducing new legislation and detailed guideline regulations. The recent Law 
on Enforcement of Civil Judgment, which took effect from 1 July 2009, has helped to im-
prove the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Vietnam.
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3	 Bit	Disputes	and	the	ICSID	Convention	in	Vietnam
3.1 BITs and Dispute Settlement Provisions
Vietnam has signed over 60 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), including with 
South Korea, China, the USA, Australia, France, and Germany. One of the key compo-
nents of a BIT is the dispute settlement clause, which allows parties to the investment ac-
cess to a dispute settlement facility. In the event of an investor-state dispute, the most 
common clause within a BIT will allow conditional access to an arbitration center such as 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, Vietnam International Arbitration Center, and others.2 Vietnam is 
not a signatory, or contracting party to the International Centre for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, although it has come under pressure to sign up to the 
ICSID mechanism from the international community, as many BITs prefer to use the 
mechanism in the event of an investment-related dispute.3
3.2 The Vietnamese Legal System and ICSID Compatibility
The conditionality of access to the ICSID Dispute Settlement Mechanism is depen-
dent on a number of requirements. Firstly, consent from the contracting parties to the dis-
pute, and this can be either through a consent clause agreed upon by both parties, or 
through the domestic legislation of the host state. In the instance of Vietnam, this would 
be, if Vietnam were party to the ICSID mechanism, the Law on Commercial Arbitration 
(No.54/2010/QH12) along with Resolution No. 01/2014/NQ-HDTP,4 which applies to 
disputes that are both domestic and foreign in nature. The Law on Commercial Arbitra-
tion is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
and thus, many of the key aspects of the Law on Commercial Arbitration, including all 
stages of the arbitral process from arbitration agreement to the enforcement of the arbitral 
award.
Secondly, a general principle of international law is that the parties to the international 
investment or “cross-border transaction,” may choose which law their contract will be ex-
ecuted under.5 In Vietnam, the key sources of contract law come from the Civil Code, 
which governs the creation of civil contracts, and commercial contracts fall under the 
guidance of the Ordinance on Economic Contracts (OEC).6 Part VII of the Civil Code re-
2 Christoph Schreuer, “The World Bank/ICSID Dispute Settlement Procedures,” 150.
3 Ibid.
4 Net Le, “Arbitration Multi-jurisdictional Guide 2014/2015,” 2.
5 Quan Hien Nguyen, “Cross Border Transactions in Vietnam and the Vietnam-US Bilateral Trade Agreement,” 163.
6 Net Le, Contract Law in Vietnam, 26.
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fers to civil transactions involving foreign factors, and Net notes that this is the Vietnam-
ese equivalent of international private law in other countries,7 and as such, it governs 
cross-border transactions between a foreign party and a domestic party.8 On this basis that 
the Vietnam Law on Commercial Arbitration has been developed and thus well harmo-
nized with the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, along with the Civil Code and Ordinance on 
Economic Contracts, there is scope to suggest that the legal frameworks exist to support 
the application of the ICSID mechanism under Vietnamese jurisdiction.
3.3 BIT Disputes in Practice in Vietnam
3.3.1 Vietnamese Courts
While the legal structures for cross-border transaction disputes may be present in 
Vietnam, as discussed above, there are a number of issues that increase risk in the event 
of a dispute. Firstly, the procedure for enforcement of international arbitral awards is 
complex in Vietnam; as a result of the inclusion of various authorities in the award en-
forcement process, including the Ministry of Justice, Provincial court, the Supreme Court, 
and finally an enforcement agency charged with enforcing the award. The inclusion of 
Vietnamese courts creates a further issue relating to the enforcement of the award, as the 
Vietnamese legal regime does not operate on the basis of precedent or case law; therefore, 
the enforcement of foreign awards has been hindered due to inconsistent and inaccurate 
interpretations.
3.3.2 Grounds for Refusal of Enforcement of Foreign Awards
The second key issue extends further with the interpretation of Vietnamese courts, 
such as in the case of Conares Metal v Co Khi A; the court found that the sales contract 
and the arbitration agreement were not separate, and as the sales contract was rendered 
invalid by the signatory lacking authorization to enter into the agreement, the arbitration 
agreement was also invalid. Thus the arbitration award was deemed unenforceable. Blan-
co et al note that this view of the courts was in contradiction to the common law under-
standing.9
The 2010 Law on Commercial Arbitration also includes the phrase “contrary to the 
basic principles of the Laws of Vietnam,” which is carried over from the previous law on 
arbitration. This phrase is noted for its lack of definition, and is therefore open to wide in-
terpretation by Vietnamese courts. In the case of Tyco v Leighton, the court is noted for 
7 Ibid.
8 Civil Code, Art. 826.
9 Elena Blanco, Tran Anh Dung, and Umut Turksen, “Evolving to Perfection? Enforcement of International Arbitral 
Awards in Vietnam,” 1002.
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not explaining which “basic principle” was violated, and interpreted the “basic principle” 
as “any legal provision within the Vietnamese Statute books,”10 and thus as any legal pro-
vision can be violated, the courts can deem the award as falling outside the jurisdiction of 
Vietnamese law and unenforceable. In the Yukos11 cases, Russia attempted to argue that 
the investors did not qualify as investors, as the Energy Charter Treaty contained a broad 
interpretation of what defined an “investor.”12 This issue of interpretation allowed Russia 
to deny the enforcement of the arbitration award by the UNCITRAL rules on the Russian 
state,13 and has acted to set a precedent in international investment law regarding the risk 
to foreign investors associated with the broad interpretation of terms and the misuse of 
this by the court systems of the host state.
3.4 The Maintenance of Sovereignty Over BIT Disputes
Sovereign immunity is a principle of international law that is based on one state not 
being subject to the jurisdiction of another state, or the rules of an international arbitration 
forum.14 In the context of ICSID, this concept of sovereign immunity is challenged, as 
contracting parties give “consent to the submission of a dispute.”15 With the rapid growth 
of international commerce, this, a potent force in international trade, was tamed with the 
introduction of treaties, including friendship and investment.16 With regard to ICSID, the 
threat of jurisdictional immunity exists in the lack of requirement for a domestic court to 
support the ICSID mechanism, like that of the UNCITRAL Model Law system.17 This is 
at odds with, as previously mentioned, the Vietnamese requirement for provincial and the 
Supreme Court to enforce foreign awards. The detached nature of the ICSID system 
means that a provincial court can decline this jurisdiction if it does not comply with the 
ICSID arbitration clause.18 For Vietnam, the use of domestic courts is familiar with dis-
putes that follow the UNCITRAL rules. For disputes that largely use ICSID mechanisms, 
this potentially gives the state the option to create a jurisdictional issue, as a provincial 
court in the defendant’s domestic jurisdiction, i.e. Vietnam, can decline jurisdiction if an 
ICSID dispute is raised against it. Furthermore, the state could utilize this to claim state 
responsibility in a particular action, and intervene at the recognition and enforcement 
stage of an ICSID proceeding, and “decline jurisdiction if a dispute is brought to it in 
10 Ibid., 1004.
11 Yukos Universal Limited v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 227.
12 Emmanuel Gailliard and Yas Banifatemi. “Yukos: Landmark Decision on the Energy Charter Treaty,” 79.
13 Ibid.
14 Okezie Chukwumerije, “ICSID Arbitration and Sovereign Immunity,”  166.
15 Andrew E. L. Tucker, “The Energy Charter Treaty and ‘Compulsory’ International State/Investor Arbitration,” 
522.
16 Okezie Chukwumerije, “ICSID Arbitration and Sovereign Immunity,” 172.
17 Ibid., 174.
18 Ibid.
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contravention of an ICSID arbitration clause.”19
3.5 ICSID and China as Comparative Analysis
The issue of sovereign immunity and international arbitration is not unique to Viet-
nam; China had ratified the ICSID Convention in 1993, but showed its reluctance to allow 
the acceptance of the jurisdiction center until recently.20 This was born out of China’s 
economy being largely a destination for  foreign investment, and as a result, the desire to 
control possible disputes with foreign investors within China.21 This supports the idea in 
the aforementioned discussion on the sovereignty over investment-related disputes, as 
China only allowed a very limited use of the ICSID mechanism in the event of an expro-
priation and nationalization in accordance with its notification under Article 25(4) of the 
Convention.22 China began to allow ICSID jurisdiction more widely when its economy 
began to outwardly invest in other countries. In the instance of Vietnam, outward invest-
ment has reached $22 billion annually as of 2014,23 and shows no signs of decreasing. 
This could lead to  greater pressure from domestic investors to ratify the ICSID rules, al-
though this would still require the express consent of the Vietnamese state as per Art. 
25(1) of the ICSID Convention before the arbitration rules could have jurisdiction in Viet-
nam. This could prove to be an issue considering the perceived favoring of national provi-
sions over international legal instruments, as noted in the case of Energo Novus v Infecti-
mex,
24
 in which the Vietnamese court referred only to the domestic 1995 Ordinance 
instead of the New York Convention.25
As mentioned, the latest wave of investment agreements signed by China have al-
lowed greater flexibility and application of the ICSID arbitration rules, and possibly the 
trade and investment agreement with the greatest level of detail for the use of arbitration 
is the China-New Zealand FTA signed in 2008, which goes into great detail with regard to 
the rules on disputes within the jurisdiction of the agreement. Notably, China ensures that 
that the dispute mechanism’s powers are contained, particularly by preventing the import-
ing of other dispute resolution provisions by using most-favored nations clauses, thus pre-
venting the use of the treaty through “treaty shopping.”
19 Ibid.
20 Monika. C. E. Heymann, “International Law and the Settlement of Investment Disputes Relating to China,” 51.
21 Ibid., 53.
22 China submitted a notification on 7 January 1993 declaring that it “would only consider submitting to the jurisdic-
tion of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes disputes over compensation resulting from 
expropriation and nationalization.”
23 The Voice of Vietnam, “Vietnam’s outward FDI: Is the tide turning?,” http://english.vov.vn/Economy/Vietnams-
outward-FDI-Is-the-tide-turning/287821.vov. Accessed March 6, 2015.
24 Energo Novus v Infectimex, 1995.
25 Elena Blanco, Tran Anh Dung, and Umut Turksen, “Evolving to Perfection? Enforcement of International Arbitral 
Awards in Vietnam,” 1005.
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Secondly, China also allows the state party the right to object to a claim if it is “mani-
festly without merit or otherwise outside the jurisdiction of competence of the tribunal”;26 
Article 36 of the ICSID Convention provides for this; however, the scope of this particular 
provision is far greater and allows China to wield sovereign influence over the dispute 
process. This could be an option for Vietnam, which is keen to ensure a degree of sover-
eignty over the arbitration process, should it choose to become a signatory to the ICSID 
Convention, appeasing the demands of investors for at least a partially independent ICSID 
dispute settlement jurisdiction.
Thirdly, while many of China’s investment treaties refer disputes to domestic courts, 
which generally means that the disputing party will have to choose either the route of a 
domestic court, or arbitration, the China/New Zealand FTA allows for the disputing par-
ties to submit the dispute to arbitration even after it has been submitted to the domestic 
court, so long as it is withdrawn from the court before the final judgment has been made. 
In the case of Vietnam, such a provision could be beneficial in two ways, allowing the 
state to retain domestic jurisdiction over disputes when the parties choose this, but still al-
lowing for investors the option of international arbitration. This also places a limitation on 
the disputing party, in that once they have chosen the route of a domestic court, they may 
not be able to make a claim under international law. Allowing the Vietnamese government 
to both retain domestic jurisdiction and provide for international arbitration under ICSID 
in its investment treaties could act as a progressive solution for all parties.
4	 Conclusion
This article has sought to discuss the both the mechanisms for the enforcement of 
contracts under Vietnamese jurisdiction, and to consider the risks associated with the en-
forcement of foreign contracts in the country, specifically international transactional dis-
putes that are also subject to the jurisdiction of Bilateral Investment Treaties. The first 
section provides a foundation for the analysis of contracts enforcement, discussing the 
cultural, political, and judicial roles that influence the provisions for contract enforcement 
in Vietnam. The second section discusses the key aspects of contract enforcement in Viet-
nam. The legal provisions for dispute resolution are discussed in this section, and both 
domestic and foreign contract enforcement frameworks are discussed, along with the 
practical issues related to both. The final section moves onto foreign disputes in Vietnam 
that fall under the jurisdiction of BITs, and addresses the key issues related to this from 
the Vietnamese perspective, and also through the lens of case studies as comparative ex-
amples.
The legal framework of Vietnam has undergone significant reform in the past decade 
26 Art. 154 (2) New Zealand FTA (2008).
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to bring it in line with international norms of international investment law, and the coun-
try has the legal framework to support the international arbitral frameworks that ensure 
reduced risk for foreign investors. The key issues with introducing the ICSID Convention 
into Vietnam lie in the role of the courts in arbitration proceedings, and in the sense that 
foreign arbitration in Vietnam is currently governed primarily by a complex layer of court 
proceedings and their individual interpretations are not governed by precedent or case 
law. This increases the risk that courts will exercise sovereignty over BIT international ar-
bitration awards with broad interpretations, similar to the actions of the Russian courts 
during the Yukos cases. For the Vietnamese government to reduce the risk associated with 
the international arbitration in BIT disputes, less broad interpretations by the court system 
will be required, which could allow for the country to sign the ICSID Convention, per-
haps following the path of China’s relationship with the Convention and undertaking a 
gradual acceptance of ICSID into its international arbitration system.
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